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Abstract 
 This article considers section 4(2)(b) of the South African 
Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 (hereafter the CPA), which 
grants a power to courts and the National Consumer Tribunal to 
make "appropriate orders to give practical effect to the consumer's 
right of access to redress", including, but not limited to, "any 
innovative order that better advances, protects, promotes and 
assures the realisation by consumers of their rights" in terms of 
the CPA (in addition to any order provided for in the CPA). First, 
a brief overview of the provisions on interpretation of the CPA is 
given, to give context to the interpretation of the power of the 
courts to make innovative orders. Thereafter, instances are 
discussed where it is undoubtedly clear that innovative orders are 
needed, that is, where the CPA creates a right without a remedy. 
Examples are the consumer's right to receive delivery of the 
goods or performance of the services within a reasonable time 
where no time for performance was agreed upon, and the 
consumer's right to assume that "the supplier has the legal right, 
or the authority of the legal owner", to supply the goods. This part 
includes analysis and criticism of the only reported decision which 
discusses the delineation of the power to grant innovative orders, 
and which unjustifiably refused to grant such an order in respect 
of the consumer's right that the goods supplied "remain useable 
and durable for a reasonable time". 
The article then considers situations where there is no clear gap 
in the CPA such as a right without a remedy, but the CPA is 
nevertheless ambiguous and policy considerations call for an 
innovative order. This part gives an example of a case where the 
National Consumer Tribunal briefly referred to section 4(2)(b) on 
innovative orders in support of a new rule on the suspension of 
prescription (time limitation) not recognised in the text of the CPA. 
Part 5 of the article considers the types of orders that were 
probably envisaged by the legislature when drafting section 
4(2)(b) on innovative orders, such as publicity and compliance 
programme orders, which serve to increase the effectiveness and 
preventative effect of orders on prohibited conduct. This part of 
the article considers legislation from the United Kingdom on such 
orders, which is referred to as "enhanced consumer measures". 
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1 Introduction 
Section 4(2)(b) of the South African Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 
(hereafter the CPA) provides that the National Consumer Tribunal or court 
must  
(i) promote the spirit and purposes of this Act; and  
(ii) make appropriate orders to give practical effect to the consumer's right 
of access to redress, including, but not limited to  
(aa) any order provided for in this Act; and  
(bb) any innovative order that better advances protects, promotes 
and assures the realisation by consumers of their rights in 
terms of this Act. 
Is this power to make innovative orders a good thing? When should it be 
used? An example of an instance where the court or Tribunal should grant 
innovative orders to protect consumer rights is where the CPA creates a right 
but is silent on the remedies. Examples are the consumer's right to receive 
delivery of the goods or performance of the services within a reasonable time 
where no time for performance was agreed upon1 and the consumer's right 
to assume that "the supplier has the legal right or the authority of the legal 
owner to supply" the goods.2 However, as will be discussed below, there are 
other instances in which it is not as clear that the court or tribunal should 
make an innovative order. There is thus a need to determine the limits of the 
power to make an innovative order, in order not to transgress the rule of law, 
and to delineate in which circumstances such an order is desirable and 
consistent with the rest of the CPA, particularly the provisions on the 
interpretation and purposes of the Act.  
A question that arises is whether the CPA should empower enforcement 
agencies such as the National Consumer Commission (hereafter the NCC) 
and provincial consumer protection authorities to propose remedies which 
are not specifically provided for in the CPA to suppliers who breached 
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1  Section 19(2)(a) of the CPA. 
2  Section 44 of the CPA. 
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consumers' rights, and failing agreement with the suppliers on the proposed 
remedies, to apply to the National Consumer Tribunal (hereafter the NCT) or 
court for such "innovative orders" on behalf of consumers.  
This article is structured as follows. First, the provisions on the interpretation 
of the CPA will be referred to in order to give context to the interpretation of 
the power to give innovative orders (Part 2 below). Thereafter, Part 3 will 
consider instances where it is clear that innovative orders are needed, 
namely where the CPA creates a right without a remedy. This will include 
discussion of a case where the court unjustifiably rejected an argument that 
an innovative order should be made and gave the only reported decision 
which discusses the delineation of the power to grant innovative orders. Part 
4 discusses situations where there is no clear gap in the legislation such as 
a right without a remedy, but the CPA is nevertheless ambiguous and policy 
considerations call for an innovative order. This Part gives an example of a 
case where the NCT briefly referred to the relevant sub-section allowing 
innovative orders in support of a new rule on prescription (time limitation) not 
recognised in the text of the CPA. Part 5 considers the types of orders that 
were probably envisaged by the legislature when providing for the power to 
make innovative orders, such as publicity and compliance programme 
orders, which serve to increase the effectiveness and preventative effect of 
orders on prohibited conduct. Part 6 will set out conclusions. 
2 The power to make innovative orders in the light of the 
provisions on interpretation of the CPA 
Section 2(1) of the CPA provides that the Act must be "interpreted in a 
manner that gives effect to the purposes set out in section 3".3 Section 
4(2)(b)(i) reiterates that the NCT or the court must "promote the spirit and 
purposes of [the CPA]". Section 4(3) confirms that a court or Tribunal, when 
faced with more than one reasonable meaning of a provision in the Act, read 
in its context,  
must prefer the meaning that best promotes the spirit and purposes of this Act, 
and will best improve the realisation and enjoyment of consumer rights 
generally, and in particular by persons contemplated in section 3(1)(b). 
Section 3(1) sets out the purposes of the Act. It provides that  
[t]he purposes of this Act are to promote and advance the social and economic 
welfare of consumers in South Africa by—  
                                            
3  For a detailed discussion of s 3(1)(b) of the CPA and the nature and impact of 
vulnerability, see De Stadler "Section 3" para 5. 
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(a) establishing a legal framework for the achievement and maintenance 
of a consumer market that is fair, accessible, efficient, sustainable and 
responsible for the benefit of consumers generally;  
(b) reducing and ameliorating any disadvantages experienced in 
accessing any supply of goods or services by consumers— 
(i) who are low-income persons or persons comprising of low-
income communities;  
(ii) who live in remote, isolated or low-density population areas or 
communities;  
(iii) who are minors, seniors or other similarly vulnerable 
consumers; or  
(iv) whose ability to read and comprehend any advertisement, 
agreement, mark, instruction, label, warning, notice or other 
visual representation is limited by reason of low literacy, vision 
impairment or limited fluency in the language in which the 
representation is produced, published or presented;  
(c) promoting fair business practices;  
(d) protecting consumers from—  
(i) unconscionable, unfair, unreasonable, unjust or otherwise 
improper trade practices; and  
(ii) deceptive, misleading, unfair or fraudulent conduct;  
(e) improving consumer awareness and information and encouraging 
responsible and informed consumer choice and behaviour;  
(f) promoting consumer confidence, empowerment, and the development 
of a culture of consumer responsibility, through individual and group 
education, vigilance, advocacy and activism;  
(g) providing for a consistent, accessible and efficient system of 
consensual resolution of disputes arising from consumer transactions; 
and  
(h) providing for an accessible, consistent, harmonised, effective and 
efficient system of redress for consumers. 
Most of the purposes in the sub-section indicate that any ambiguous 
provision in the Act must be interpreted in favour of the consumer, particularly 
consumers who are "vulnerable" as a result of a low income, low literacy, old 
age or any other similar factor.4 
However, even though the purpose of the legislation is relevant, the language 
remains the primary consideration.5 After all, "it is not the function of a court 
to do violence to the language of a statute and impose its view of what the 
policy or object of a measure should be".6 The court or Tribunal cannot 
                                            
4  See s 3(1)(b) of the CPA. See De Stadler and Du Plessis "Section 2" para 11.  
5  Du Plessis 1981 SALJ 211; De Stadler and Du Plessis "Section 2" para 11. 
6  Standard Bank Investment Corporation v Competition Commission; Liberty Life 
Association of Africa Ltd v Competition Commission 2000 2 SA 797 (SCA) 810D based 
on Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 530 543, as also cited by De 
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disregard the language of the statute in order to reach an outcome with 
favours vulnerable consumers.7 In the common law there is a presumption 
that "in case of doubt, the most beneficial interpretation is preferred". In this 
particular instance, the legislation adds that the interpretation must be 
beneficial to vulnerable consumers. Even in this context this does not give 
the court or Tribunal licence to create legislation.8 In addition, it may be noted 
that an interpretation skewed in favour of consumers may ultimately prejudice 
them if the supplier has to drive up prices to provide for drastic consumer 
remedies. Thus the interpretation process should also have due regard to 
suppliers' interests and what effect the particular interpretation will have on 
them, and thus indirectly on consumers. This interpretation that suppliers' 
interests must also be taken into account for the benefit of consumers 
generally is bolstered by section 3(1)(a), which emphasises the attainment of 
a consumer market that is "fair, accessible, efficient, sustainable and 
responsible for the benefit of consumers generally". 
As far as the power to make innovative orders is concerned, it is clear from 
section 4(2)(b) that these orders go beyond orders specified in the Act. It is 
also clear that these orders must be "appropriate" and must be made if such 
an order "better advances, protects, promotes and assures the realisation by 
consumers of their rights in terms of this Act". Thus, where consumers have 
a right under the Act, courts or the Tribunal may make innovative orders that 
protect or promote or advance such rights. This applies particularly strongly 
to instances where the CPA creates a right without mentioning a remedy, as 
will be discussed below.  
3 Instances where the CPA creates a right without a remedy 
so that an innovative order is justified 
The CPA is not perfectly drafted. In various instances, it creates rights without 
stating a remedy. This calls for the amendment of the Act, but as this takes 
time, in the meantime these situations probably call for innovative orders to 
give effect to the rights recognised in the Act. 
An example is the consumer's right in section 55(2)(c) that goods must 
remain "useable and durable for a reasonable period of time", which is in 
                                            
Stadler and Du Plessis "Section 2" para 10. As noted by De Stadler and Du Plessis 
"Section 2" para 11, this principle was discussed with specific reference to the CPA in 
Afriforum v Minister of Trade and Industry 2013 4 SA 63 (GNP) and Byleveld v Execor 
Twelve (Pty) Ltd t/a Motor City 2014 ZANCT 2 (24 February 2014). 
7  De Stadler and Du Plessis "Section 2" para 11. 
8  Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes 161; De Stadler and Du Plessis "Section 2" 
para 11. 
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addition to the right that goods be free of defects at delivery. The remedies 
for the breach of the rights in section 55 are set out in section 56, namely a 
choice between repair, replacement or refund within six months of delivery. 
However, some goods can reasonably be expected to remain durable for 
more than six months. Yet the Act does not give a remedy beyond six months. 
Thus there is a right without a remedy. Often suppliers will give contractual 
guarantees extending beyond six months, but sometimes they do not. An 
amendment of the CPA is called for to clarify the position. But in the 
meantime, the court or Tribunal should fashion an appropriate remedy.9 For 
example, a court could order that after the conclusion of the six months period 
the consumer should be entitled only to a repair or a reduction in price, but 
perhaps to a replacement or refund in the case of a serious defect, making 
provision for the value of the use the consumer has received.10 In other 
words, a court or Tribunal should grant a remedy beyond the six month period 
on the basis of its power to make an innovative order that protects the 
consumer's right that the goods remain useable and durable for a reasonable 
period.11  
However, the court in Vousvoukis v Queen Ace CC t/a Ace Motors12 
specifically rejected an argument that it should use its power to make an 
innovative order to grant a remedy when the goods could be expected to 
endure for longer than six months.13 It concluded that  
The Legislature, for whatever reason, has expressly decreed a limitation period 
of six months for the return of any goods in section 56(2). There is no question 
of section 56(2) being ambiguous in any way. In my view, it is not open to a 
court, under the guise of making an "innovative order", to extend this period. 
Any innovative order made under section 56(2) must be made within the 
constraints of the legislation and cannot afford consumers more rights than 
those specifically provided for in the Act.14 
The court's arguments are not persuasive. It does not matter whether or not 
section 56 is ambiguous. Rather, the point is that section 55(2)(c) creates a 
right without a remedy. The court did not engage with arguments that some 
goods can reasonably be expected to endure beyond six months. As such, 
granting a remedy beyond the six months period is still "within the constraints 
of the legislation", given the clear right in section 55(2)(c), which is not 
protected by a remedy.  
                                            
9  Naude 2011 SA Merc LJ 347; De Stadler "Section 56" para 9. 
10  Naude 2011 SA Merc LJ 347; De Stadler "Section 56" para 9. 
11  Naude 2011 SA Merc LJ 347; De Stadler "Section 56" para 9. 
12  Vousvoukis v Queen Ace CC t/a Ace Motors 2016 3 SA 188 (ECG). 
13  The court cited the argument by De Stadler "Section 56" para 9. 
14  Vousvoukis v Queen Ace CC t/a Ace Motors 2016 3 SA 188 (ECG) para 110. 
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It should also be noted that the Consumer Goods and Services Ombud 
(hereafter the CGSO), in its latest Advisory Note on consumer's rights 
regarding defective goods, specifically rejects the conclusions in Vousvoukis 
in this regard.15 The Ombud argues that the court's interpretation  
… has the unintended consequence of undermining or rendering nugatory the 
right to goods that are durable for a reasonable period of time… particularly so 
in respect of so-called durable goods (defined as a category of consumer 
products that do not need to be purchased frequently because they are made 
to last for a long time, usually lasting for three years or more). Examples would 
be motor vehicles, furniture, televisions, washing machines and refrigerators.16 
The Ombud rejected the conclusion in Vousvoukis that section 56(2) is 
unambiguous. The Ombud argued that this sub-section is arguably 
ambiguous by emphasising the words "at the direction of the consumer" in 
section 56(2).17 The Ombud stated that this can mean that within the six 
months period the consumer may choose between repair, replacement or 
refund, but that after the six months period it is not the consumer who may 
choose between these remedies, but the supplier.18 The Ombud relied on the 
views of Naude19 and Barnard20 and the position in several foreign 
jurisdictions which also recognise a right that goods must remain durable for 
a reasonable period of time.21  
Barnard argues that the implied warranty in section 56 does not expire after 
six months, but that the six months limitation period applies to the "execution 
of the remedies" so that "the implied warranty will exist indefinitely and the 
normal prescription rules regarding the institution of a claim will prevail".22 
However, she does not spell out which remedies will still be available after 
the six months period. In support of her view, she cites an article by Jacobs, 
Stoop and Van Niekerk, who suggest that after the six months period, the 
                                            
15  CGSO Date unknown http://www.cgso.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/CGSO-
ADVISORY-NOTE-1-RETURNS-REVISION-3.pdf?87ab66&87ab66. 
16  CGSO Date unknown http://www.cgso.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/CGSO-
ADVISORY-NOTE-1-RETURNS-REVISION-3.pdf?87ab66&87ab66 12. 
17  CGSO Date unknown http://www.cgso.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/CGSO-
ADVISORY-NOTE-1-RETURNS-REVISION-3.pdf?87ab66&87ab66 12. 
18  CGSO Date unknown http://www.cgso.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/CGSO-
ADVISORY-NOTE-1-RETURNS-REVISION-3.pdf?87ab66&87ab66 12. 
19  Naude 2011 SA Merc LJ 347. 
20  Barnard 2012 De Jure 467-468. 
21  CGSO Date unknown http://www.cgso.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/CGSO-
ADVISORY-NOTE-1-RETURNS-REVISION-3.pdf?87ab66&87ab66 9-12. 
22  CGSO Date unknown http://www.cgso.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/CGSO-
ADVISORY-NOTE-1-RETURNS-REVISION-3.pdf?87ab66&87ab66 9-12. 
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consumer still has a claim for damages (presumably then not a claim for 
refund, replacement or repair).23 
However, it is submitted that confining the consumer to a damages claim after 
the six months is not desirable. The NCT may not make an award for 
damages, for example, and neither would the CGSO, and the requirements 
for obtaining damages are arduous for consumers. The consumer would 
have to approach a court, and only after obtaining a certificate from the NCT 
confirming that prohibited conduct did occur.24 
A court or the NCT should rather decide what remedies could fairly be 
granted to consumers after six months, taking into account the severity of the 
defect and the beneficial use that the consumer has obtained from the goods 
until the defect manifested. An even better solution would be for the 
legislature to overhaul section 56 to make the position clear.25 
In the meantime, not granting consumers any remedies after six months for 
infringement of their right that goods must remain useable and durable for a 
reasonable period of time, which may exceed six months, implicates the 
purpose of the Act of providing for an accessible and effective system of 
redress for consumers,26 and also of maintaining an accessible 
marketplace.27 If a consumer is denied the right to return goods that are 
defective and that could have been expected to remain durable for longer 
than six months, or to obtain a repair, the consumer is left without access to 
a replacement. Low-income consumers especially do not have the resources 
to self-fund a replacement or repair. Thus the purpose of the CPA to 
ameliorate the disadvantages experienced by vulnerable consumers in 
accessing goods or services comes into play. 
Another example of a right without a remedy in the CPA is the consumer's 
right to assume that the supplier has the legal title or authority of the owner 
to sell the goods.28 The CPA does not set out any remedies for the breach of 
this right by suppliers, and so does not deal with the controversy whether the 
consumer who is evicted by the true owner can claim damages with the 
purchase price as a minimum or rather only the lower value of the goods at 
eviction, where the goods decreased in value from the time of the purchase. 
                                            
23  Jacobs, Stoop and Van Niekerk 2010 PELJ 373. 
24  Section 115 of the CPA. 
25  CGSO Date unknown http://www.cgso.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/CGSO-
ADVISORY-NOTE-1-RETURNS-REVISION-3.pdf?87ab66&87ab66 12. 
26  Section 3(1)(g) of the CPA. 
27  Section 3(1)(a) of the CPA. 
28  Section 44 of the CPA. 
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The courts will probably follow the common law in this regard, where the point 
of departure is that foreseeable damages with the purchase price as a 
minimum can be claimed by the ultimate purchaser of the goods.29 However, 
some uncertainty has been created by an obiter dictum in the leading case 
of Alpha Trust (Edms) Bpk v Van der Watt,30 that in the case of a rapidly 
depreciating asset, a lesser amount than the purchase price ought perhaps 
to be recoverable. In any event, it is clear that an innovative order is called 
for to give effect to the consumer's right under section 44. 
Consumers' right to be informed of their cooling-off right after direct marketing 
is another right without a remedy in the CPA.31 The Act is silent on the effect 
of a failure to so inform the consumer. Obviously, it would be prohibited 
conduct which could be punished by an administrative penalty under section 
111. However, the supplier's obligation to inform the consumer would have 
been more effective if the CPA had provided for an extension of the cooling-
off period if the obligation was breached. Again, until the CPA is amended, 
an innovative order should be considered here. There are various ways in 
which a legislative amendment could be formulated to give a remedy for 
consumers' right to be informed of their cooling-off right. One option would be 
for the cooling-off period to start to run once the consumer is properly 
informed of the cooling-off right. Another option would be to provide that the 
cooling-off period expires only 12 months after the end of the initial cooling-
off period, but if the trader did inform the consumer of the cooling-off right 
within those 12 months, the cooling-off period could expire 14 days after the 
consumer receives the information.32 In Section Three Dolphin Coast Medical 
Centre CC v Cowar Investments (Pty) Ltd,33 a court held that a contract for 
the sale of land was voidable where the seller failed to include a reference to 
the statutory cooling-off right of the buyer under the Alienation of Land Act.34 
This would be another option. Until the CPA is amended in this regard, a court 
or the Tribunal should be willing to order that the cooling-off period starts to 
run only once the consumer is informed thereof. That would be an innovative 
                                            
29  Alpha Trust (Edms) Bpk v Van der Watt 1975 3 SA 734 (A). 
30  Alpha Trust (Edms) Bpk v Van der Watt 1975 3 SA 734 (A). 
31  Section 32 of the CPA. 
32  This is the rule in art 10 of the EC Consumer Rights Directive (Directive 2011/83/EU 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on Consumer 
Rights OJ L 304/64 (22 November 2011)). Section 82(3)(d) of the Australian 
Consumer Law (Schedule 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act, 2010) provides for 
a six months cooling-off period if the supplier failed to inform the consumer of the 
cooling-off period upon contracting with the consumer. 
33  Section Three Dolphin Coast Medical Centre CC v Cowar Investments (Pty) Ltd 2006 
2 SA 15 (D). 
34  Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981. 
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order designed to better advance, protect, promote and ensures the 
realisation of the consumer's right to be informed of the cooling-off right.35  
Another example of a right recognised by the CPA with no remedy is the 
consumer's rights to delivery of the goods or performance of the services 
within a reasonable time where no date or time for performance was agreed 
upon by the parties.36 The Act is silent on the consumer's remedies for the 
breach of this right. Should the consumer immediately have the right to cancel 
the contract after this reasonable time has elapsed? Or are the consumer's 
remedies the same as under the common law, namely that the creditor may 
cancel for mora debitoris (delay on the part of the debtor) only after a demand 
and notice of rescission (a warning of the possible cancellation if performance 
is not forthcoming by a date specified in the notice), unless "time is of the 
essence under the contract"?37 Until the legislature clarifies the position, 
courts and the NCT will have to make a decision on the basis of an innovative 
order whether to follow the common law or rather to allow the immediate 
cancellation after a reasonable time. 
4 Ambiguity in the CPA and policy considerations call for an 
innovative order  
Should innovative orders be granted in circumstances where there is no clear 
gap in the legislation in the form of a right without a remedy, but the Act is 
arguably ambiguous and policy considerations cry out for an innovative 
order?  
4.1 Suspension of prescription under section 116 CPA 
The NCT has fashioned a new rule on the interruption or suspension of 
extinctive prescription (time limitation) not contained in either the Prescription 
Act38 or the CPA, in Lazarus v RDB Project Management CC t/a Solid 
(hereafter Lazarus).39 The NCT referred briefly as justification to section 
4(2)(b) of the CPA, which includes the power to make innovative orders, 
without expressly stating that it was exercising its power to make an 
innovative order. Before this decision is discussed, a brief background to the 
relevant statutory provisions will be supplied. 
                                            
35  See the wording of s 4(2)(b) of the CPA in this regard. 
36  Section 19(2)(a) of the CPA. 
37  Van Huyssteen, Lubbe and Reinecke Contract 294-301. 
38  Prescription Act 68 of 1969. 
39  Lazarus v RDB Project Management CC t/a Solid 2016 ZANCT 15 (9 June 2016). 
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Section 116(1) CPA provides that  
[a] complaint in terms of the CPA may not be referred or made to the Tribunal 
or a consumer court more than three years after  
(a) the act or omission that is the cause of the complaint; or  
(b) in the case of a course of conduct or continuing practice, the date that 
the conduct or practice ceased. 
The Prescription Act therefore governs complaints referred to the courts, but 
the very simplistic section 116 governs complaints referred to the NCT or 
provincial consumer courts. The Prescription Act (which generally provides 
for a three-year prescription period for debts) provides for the judicial 
interruption of prescription if the creditor serves any "process" on the debtor.40 
In this context "process" is defined as including  
… a petition, a notice of motion, a rule nisi, a pleading in reconvention, a third 
party notice referred to in any rule of court, and any document whereby legal 
proceedings are commenced.41 
"Legal proceedings" are not defined. However, "a document whereby legal 
proceedings are commenced" probably does not encompass forms filled in 
or letters written to refer consumer complaints to ombuds, provincial 
consumer protection authorities, Alternative Dispute Resolution agents or the 
NCC. Neither does the CPA contain an equivalent provision on the 
interruption of prescription when the consumer lays a complaint with these 
other enforcement agencies provided for in the CPA. This is problematic, 
because section 69 of the CPA prescribes that consumers must first exhaust 
all other remedies available under national legislation before approaching a 
court. Therefore, the consumer is expected to approach an accredited 
industry ombud, provincial consumer court (in respect of suppliers operating 
in that province) and the NCC before the consumer may approach a court. In 
cases where direct referral to the NCT is possible, the consumer is also 
expected to approach the NCT first before approaching a court. To approach 
the NCT, the consumer must typically first obtain a notice of non-referral from 
the NCC.42 The NCC often does not take on individual complaints but typically 
first refers consumers to ombuds, whose decisions are not binding.43 So the 
consumer may be sent from pillar to post and may have an interest in 
                                            
40  Section 15(1) of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969. 
41  Section 15(6) of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969. 
42  Section 75 of the CPA. 
43  However, note that in National Consumer Commission v Western Car Sales CC t/a 
Western Car Sales 2017 ZANCT 102 (14 September 2017), the NCC brought to the 
NCT a supplier who had refused to adhere to an industry ombud's ruling and inter alia 
obtained an order that the purchase price be refunded to the consumer. 
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eventually getting a ruling from the NCT or a court. The consumer also has 
the option of approaching another Alternative Dispute Resolution Agent. All 
of these steps take time. The speed at which a complaint is dealt with also 
depends on the efficiency of the various enforcement agencies, over which 
the consumer has no control. As Van Heerden points out,  
… [t]he practical implementation of the framework of section 69 as it concerns 
the alternative dispute resolution routes, the consumer courts and the National 
Consumer Commission has not been a seamlessly easy, quick and effective 
process and in many instances has occasioned greater delay than would have 
been the case had consumers not been barred from approaching civil courts 
without first having to exhaust all remedies as required by section 96(d).44 
Vulnerable consumers may be especially hard hit by the three-year limitation 
period when read against the consumer's duties to first approach an industry 
ombud, the NCC and a provincial consumer court. Factors like a low income, 
low literacy, limited fluency in English, and residence in a remote area may 
have an impact on the likelihood of a consumer’s understanding of his or her 
rights and on the ability to enforce these rights. This problem is more acute 
for socio-economically vulnerable consumers who are excluded from redress 
due to obstacles such as a lack of access to consumer protection authorities 
and the communication channels used to make complaints.45 
The best solution would once again be for the CPA and the Prescription Act 
to be amended to take cognisance of the rules and practice on enforcement 
of the CPA and their impact on consumers. In the meantime, the NCT has 
ameliorated the impact of section 116 by providing in effect that prescription 
is suspended once the consumer takes action to bring a complaint under the 
CPA. This could be regarded as an innovative order to protect the consumer's 
right to approach the enforcement agencies listed in section 69, including the 
NCT and courts.  
The NCT in Lazarus held that prescription is interrupted during the time that 
the consumer's complaint is dealt with by a provincial consumer protection 
authority, even though the CPA contains no provisions on the interruption or 
delay in the completion of prescription. It should be noted, however, that the 
Tribunal clearly intended suspension rather than interruption, as it did not 
consider that prescription started running afresh upon referral of the 
complaint to the provincial authority, as judicial interruption under the 
Prescription Act implies.46 Rather, the NCT held that prescription did not run 
during the period that the complaint was under consideration by that authority 
                                            
44  Van Heerden "Section 116" para 4. 
45  See the discussion of s 3(1)(b) read with ss 2 and 4 of the CPA in Part II of this article. 
46  Section 15 of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969. 
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– thus, suspension of prescription was intended. This is clear from the NCT's 
conclusion that  
… [i]n the circumstances the Tribunal finds that prescription was interrupted 
during the time that the complaint was being dealt with by the Western Cape 
Consumer Protector Office. This would be from December 2012 until October 
2013, when the matter was referred to the NCC. The three year period therefore 
started on 19 October 2012 (when the crack in the counter occurred) and would 
have ended on 19 October 2015. Due to the interruption of the prescription 
period for 11 months, the prescription period only ends on 19 September 
2016.47 
The NCT may have implicitly regarded its order that prescription was 
interrupted (suspended) as an innovative order in terms of section 4(2)(b). It 
held that 
… [o]n the face of it, it would appear that the Applicant's claim has prescribed. 
The CPA is however very clear in its intent to ensure that consumer's rights are 
protected. There are numerous sections in the CPA where this intention is made 
very clear but for the current purposes Section 4(2)(b) of the CPA will suffice … 
.48 
Section 4(2)(b) refers to the NCT's and courts' duty to promote the spirit and 
purposes of the CPA and to make orders provided for in the Act, or innovative 
orders.49  
In Ngoza v Roque Quality Cars,50 the NCT extended the reasoning in the 
Lazarus judgment to confirm that referral to an industry ombud also 
"interrupts" prescription under section 116. Subsequently the NCT confirmed 
that  
… a referral of a complaint to one or more of the forums mentioned under 
section 69 of the CPA interrupts prescription.51 
Again, the application of this principle to the facts of this case shows that the 
NCT has suspension of prescription in mind, rather than interruption.52 
                                            
47  Lazarus v RDB Project Management CC t/a Solid 2016 ZANCT 15 (9 June 2016) para 
31. 
48  Lazarus v RDB Project Management CC t/a Solid 2016 ZANCT 15 (9 June 2016) para 
28. 
49  Van Heerden "Section 116" para 4 agrees that this relief could be regarded as an 
"innovative order" and notes the NCT's reference to s 4(2) of the CPA.  
50  Ngoza v Roque Quality Cars 2017 ZANCT 104 (28 September 2017). 
51  Auto Glen Motors (Pty) Ltd t/a Auto Glen v Barnes In Re: Barnes v Auto Glen Motors 
(Pty) Ltd t/a Auto Glen 2018 ZANCT 51 (23 July 2018) para 21. Also see Littlewood 
Building and Garden Services Projects CC v Hyundai Automotive South Africa (Pty) 
Ltd t/a Hyundai Springfield 2018 ZANCT 91 (26 June 2018) para 33. 
52  As is also the case in the Littlewood judgment cited in the previous footnote. 
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This interpretation of the CPA is consistent with the purpose of the CPA of 
… providing for an accessible, consistent, harmonised, effective and efficient 
system of redress for consumers.53 
Exactly because the Tribunal's interpretation could be related to the 
consumer's right to approach the agencies mentioned in section 69, granting 
an innovative order in this instance serves to "give practical effect to the 
consumer's right of access to redress" and "better advances, protects, 
promotes and assures the realisation by consumers of their rights" as section 
4(2)(b) on innovative orders requires. For that reason, the Lazarus judgment 
and those following upon it mentioned above do not militate against the rule 
of law. 
In the first judgement in Motswai v House and Home,54 the NCT went even 
further and effectively held that prescription under section 116 of the CPA is 
suspended for as long as the supplier is considering the consumer's 
complaint.55 However, this judgment was subsequently set aside by 
agreement between the parties and remitted to a fresh panel of members of 
the NCT who, firstly, correctly rejected the consumer's claim on the basis that 
the CPA provisions on defective goods did not apply to goods bought and 
delivered before the general effective date, and secondly, indicated that the 
suspension of prescription was not relevant as the consumer approached the 
NCC only more than three years after the defect had been discovered.56 This 
implies that prescription under section 116 CPA is not suspended merely 
during consideration of the consumer's complaint by the supplier, although it 
would be upon a complaint being made to the NCC. 
The more radical conclusion in the first Motswai judgment that referral of the 
complaint to the supplier suspends prescription under section 116 CPA is 
less obviously desirable.57 On the one hand, all the enforcement agencies 
mentioned in section 69 generally require consumers who complain to them 
to first lodge a complaint with the supplier.58 As such, waiting for the supplier 
                                            
53  Section 3(1)(h) of the CPA.  
54  Motswai v House and Home 2016 ZANCT 20 (7 July 2016). 
55  The NCT held that "[i]n essence, the Applicant reported the matter to the Respondent 
within 2 years and 11 months (11 January 2012 - 12 December 2014) of discovering 
the peeling off of the couches. The Applicant was within the period required by the Act 
to refer the matter directly to the Tribunal. The limitation of bringing action as 
prescribed by section 116 of the CPA does not apply in this matter" (Motswai v House 
and Home 2016 ZANCT 20 (7 July 2016) para 22). 
56  Motswai v House and Home 2017 ZANCT 57 (13 April 2017). 
57  Van Heerden "Section 116" para 4 rejects the NCT's conclusion. 
58  Eg the Consumer Goods and Services Industry Code of Conduct provides that "[i]f the 
Complaint is one that appears to fall within the CGSO's jurisdiction and the 
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to make a decision on the complaint is arguably part of the enforcement 
process that the consumer is expected to follow under section 69, and thus 
necessary "to give practical effect to the consumer's right of access to 
redress". Thus, it could be argued that prescription should also be suspended 
while the supplier is considering a complaint by the consumer. Vulnerable 
consumers may not know that they should approach an enforcement agency 
if the supplier takes a long time to decide on the complaint. However, a 
question that arises is how actively the consumer has to pursue the claim 
before prescription is suspended. Would a telephone call to the supplier's call 
centre suffice to suspend prescription or would a written complaint be 
required? What is the position if the supplier did not record all calls and denies 
that the oral complaint was made? Would prescription be suspended only 
once the consumer has submitted the proof of purchase to the supplier? 
These practical considerations militate against the argument that prescription 
should be suspended once the consumer takes any steps to complain to the 
supplier. In addition, as time elapses, the ability to properly investigate and 
defend a claim becomes almost impossible for the supplier. Rather, 
prescription should not be suspended by anything short of referring the matter 
to an enforcement agency listed in the Act, such as an accredited industry 
ombud, a provincial consumer protection agency or the NCC. The Act should 
be amended to require suppliers to inform consumers complaining to them of 
their rights to approach the industry ombud, provincial consumer protection 
agency or the NCC, and to make the contact details of these agencies 
available on request.59 Prescription should not start to run against consumers 
                                            
Complainant has not taken the matter up directly with the Participant as a first step in 
trying to resolve the matter, the CGSO will advise the Complainant to refer the matter 
to the Participant to give the Participant the opportunity to resolve the Complaint. 
Alternatively, the CGSO may directly refer the matter to the Participant with the 
permission of the Complainant" (s 11.2.7.3 of GN 271 in GG 38637 of 3 March 2015). 
Section 11.2.7.5 adds that "Any Complainant who is advised to refer the matter to the 
Participant will also be informed that he or she can again approach the CGSO, if the 
Complaint is not resolved to the satisfaction of the Complainant within 15 (fifteen) 
Business Days or such extended period as agreed between the Parties". However, s 
11.2.7.6 provides that "If it would, in the CGSO's opinion, with particular reference to 
section 3 (1) (b) of the CPA (vulnerable consumers), cause a Complainant undue 
hardship or inconvenience to refer to the Participant before obtaining the CGSO's 
assistance, the CGSO may deal with the Complaint as if the Complainant has 
approached the Participant". 
59  Paragraph 5.1.3 of the Consumer Goods and Services Industry Code provides that 
subscribers to the code and/or their staff "shall notify the Consumer of their right to 
refer Complaints to the CGSO in the event that they are unsatisfied with the 
Participant's Internal Complaints-Handling Process". In addition, the supplier must 
display a notice on its premises that it subscribes to this Code, which also provides 
the contact details of the CGSO. Para 11.3.1.8 also provides that "[w]hen dealing with 
Complaints, the Participant should make readily available to customers, complainants 
and other interested parties information concerning the Internal Complaint-Handling 
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until the supplier has so informed the consumers of their right to approach 
these agencies, and the burden of proof should be on the supplier in this 
regard. 
The legislature may also consider rather providing for a longer prescription 
period for consumers who are natural persons, say 5 years. 
4.2 Cancellation of agreements in perpetuity and agreements for the 
lifetime of the consumer under section 14 
Under section 14, fixed-term agreements may be cancelled by the consumer 
on 20 business days' notice against the payment of a reasonable cancellation 
penalty. The Minister has also prescribed the maximum duration for fixed-
terms agreements, as allowed by section 14 CPA.60 The purpose of these 
provisions is to prevent consumers’ being bound for overly long periods in 
long-term agreements. It recognises that consumers may have good reasons 
to cancel fixed-term agreements early, such as changed financial 
circumstances. The term "fixed-term agreement" is not defined in the Act. 
Does it apply to agreements to which the consumer is bound "in perpetuity" 
or for the life of the consumer? Examples would be some timeshare club 
agreements and leases. Due to numerous complaints against timeshare 
suppliers, the NCC has appointed a Panel of Inquiry to consider the 
effectiveness of current legislation regulating this sector.61 Hopefully the 
Property Time-sharing Control Act62 will be amended to provide effective 
consumer protection. In the meantime it should be noted that timeshare 
suppliers have tried to evade the provisions on unfair contract terms in the 
CPA by structuring their agreements as consumer credit agreements, to 
which the CPA does not apply (although the goods and services which form 
the subject of the credit agreement are subject to the CPA).63 If one accepts 
that a points-based timeshare agreement in perpetuity and a lease for the life 
of the lessee are subject to the CPA, does section 14 apply to such 
agreements? It is not entirely clear whether it could be argued that a contract 
for the life of the consumer or in perpetuity is a fixed-term agreement. 
Nevertheless, the purpose of section 14 applies even stronger to these long-
                                            
Process, including the CGSO's brochures and the member's pamphlets, or electric-
based information [sic]". 
60  Regulation 5 of the Consumer Protection Act Regulations of 2011, which in principle 
creates a maximum duration of two years, with some listed exceptions (GN R293 in 
GG 34180 of 1 April 2011). 
61  Mohamed 2017 http://www.gov.za/speeches/address-commissioner-ebrahim-
mohamed-media-briefing-launch-public-inquiry-vacation; PMG 2017 https://pmg. 
org.za/committee-meeting/25126/. 
62  Property Time-sharing Control Act 75 of 1983. 
63  Section 5(2)(d) of the CPA. 
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term agreements. This may lead courts or the Tribunal to make an innovative 
order that the consumer has the rights in section 14 in relation to all long-term 
agreements that are not terminable upon notice. 
5 Publicity orders, compliance programme and awareness 
orders, phased-in penalties and redress orders 
It is likely that what the legislature actually had in mind when drafting section 
4(2)(b) on innovative orders was truly innovative orders aimed at increasing 
the effectiveness of the court's or NCT's main order, such as publicity orders 
and what has been termed in the UK "enhanced consumer measures".64 The 
latter include orders that the supplier institutes a compliance programme to 
ensure that the prohibited conduct will not be repeated. It would have been 
preferable for the CPA to at least spell out in broad terms what types of orders 
could be made in this regard, to alert courts and the NCT to the possibilities 
available. Otherwise the NCT, as a creature of statute, may perhaps err on 
the side of caution and not grant such orders. The legislation should also 
provide that an enforcer, namely the NCC or the provincial consumer 
protection authority, should have the right to apply to the NCT or the court for 
such orders. Furthermore, the CPA should provide that an enforcer wishing 
to apply to the court or NCT for this type of order should first consult the 
relevant supplier in order to elicit proposals and input on a possible voluntary 
undertaking to take an enhanced consumer measure.65 Currently the NCC 
has an apparently wide power to issue compliance notices to a party that the 
NCC believes on reasonable grounds has engaged in prohibited conduct.66 
Such a compliance notice must set out "any steps that are required to be 
                                            
64  These measures are defined in s 219A of the Enterprise Act, 2002, inserted by 
Schedule 7 of the Consumer Rights Act, 2015. See generally Department for Business 
Innovation and Skills 2015 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/ 
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/431158/bis-15-292-
guidance-for-enforcers-of-consumer-law.pdf and Cartwright 2016 CLJ 271. 
65  Section 214 of the UK Enterprise Act, 2002 requires such consultation and provides 
that the enforcer must wait at least 14 days (or 28 days in situations where an 
extended consultation period is required) after the supplier has received the request 
for consultation before applying for an order or wait 7 days in the case of an interim 
enforcement order. However, no prior consultation is required where the Conduct 
Market Authority (CMA) considers an application should be made without delay (s 
214(3)). The extended consultation period is required where the supplier is 
represented by "a trade association or other business representative body that 
operates a consumer code of practice that has been approved by a public enforcer" 
(Department for Business Innovation and Skills 2015 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach
ment_data/file/431158/bis-15-292-guidance-for-enforcers-of-consumer-law.pdf 10 
para 42). 
66  Section 100 of the CPA. 
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taken and the period within which those steps must be taken".67 At least the 
National Consumer Commission Enforcement Guidelines of 2011 requires 
that "if a supplier is suspected of having breached NCC administered 
legislation, the allegation should be personally put to the supplier" and the 
supplier's response should be recorded et cetera.68 However, section 100 
does not clearly entitle the NCC to require "enhanced consumer measures" 
in a compliance notice that go beyond steps that must be taken to desist from 
the prohibited conduct. Nor do the Enforcement Guidelines clearly require the 
NCC to consult with the supplier to give input on possible measures proposed 
to deal with the alleged prohibited conduct. To give the NCC the power to 
impose such enhanced consumer measures merely by issuing a compliance 
notice, leaving it up to the supplier to take the matter on review to the NCT, 
is too extreme. Rather, the CPA should provide that the NCC or other 
enforcers should have to apply to a court or the NCT for such orders, after 
due consultation with the supplier. Compliance notices should rather be used 
to order the supplier to stop the prohibited conduct. 
5.1 Publicity orders 
Orders that the supplier publish the court or Tribunal order in some way are 
likely to increase the chance of the order having a preventative effect.69 They 
also inform other consumers adversely affected by prohibited conduct of their 
right to seek redress from the supplier. Such publicity orders are specifically 
allowed by legislation in some jurisdictions. The EC Injunctions Directive of 
2009 specifically mentions the possibility of such publicity orders.70 The UK 
Enterprise Act 2002 also allows a court enforcing the Consumer Rights Act 
2015 to "require a person against whom the order is made to publish in such 
form and manner and to such extent as the court thinks appropriate for the 
purpose of eliminating any continuing effects of the infringement (a) the order; 
(b) a corrective statement." Similarly, the Australian Consumer Law allows 
courts to make publicity orders.71  
Such publicity orders could include an order that existing customers be 
informed in writing of the court’s or Tribunal's order, or should detail the 
                                            
67  Section 100(1)(d) of the CPA. 
68  GN 492 in GG 34484 of 25 July 2011 (Part C para 2). 
69  Naudé 2010 SALJ 532, who suggested that courts make any such just and equitable 
publicity orders under their power when declaring a contract or term unconscionable 
or unfair etc under s 52 of the CPA. 
70  Article 2(1)(b) of Directive 2009/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 23 April 2009 on Injunctions for the Protection of Consumers' Interests OJ L110 (1 
May 2009). 
71  Section 246 of the Australian Consumer Law, 2010. 
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prohibited conduct and the steps to be taken to correct it, e.g. on the 
supplier's website, in the press, through social media, and/or on notices at 
the supplier's premises.72 In addition, the supplier could be ordered to inform 
the NCC, provincial consumer protection authorities and the relevant 
accredited industry ombud of the order against the supplier.73  
The UK Enterprise Act 2002 recognises a related category of enhanced 
consumer measures in addition to publicity orders, namely measures in the 
"choice category", or "consumer information measures".74 It is foreseen that 
… [t]he choice category gives the enforcer the flexibility to seek orders for the 
business to give consumers more information of the businesses [sic] past 
performance on complying with consumer law.75 
This will enable consumers to make more informed decisions when 
purchasing products. 
The court or NCT should specify the period within which the publicity order 
(or other enhanced consumer measure) should be complied with. 
5.2 Compliance programme and education and awareness 
programme orders 
The second type of innovative order that courts and the NCT should consider 
making is compliance programme or education and awareness programme 
orders, that is, orders that the supplier institute a compliance programme or 
education programme for its employees and others involved in its supply of 
goods or services to ensure that consumer rights are upheld and that the 
prohibited conduct is not repeated.76 Such orders are also allowed by the 
Australian Consumer Law77 and are one of the three types of "enhanced 
                                            
72  See Department for Business Innovation and Skills 2015 https://assets. 
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
431158/bis-15-292-guidance-for-enforcers-of-consumer-law.pdf 12, para 46. 
73  See Department for Business Innovation and Skills 2015 https://assets 
.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file
/431158/bis-15-292-guidance-for-enforcers-of-consumer-law.pdf 12, para 46. 
74  See Department for Business Innovation and Skills 2015 https://assets 
.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file
/431158/bis-15-292-guidance-for-enforcers-of-consumer-law.pdf 24. 
75  Department for Business Innovation and Skills 2015 https://assets.publishing. 
service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/431158/bis
-15-292-guidance-for-enforcers-of-consumer-law.pdf 24. 
76  Paragraph 11.3 of the Consumer Goods and Services Industry Code already sets 
requirements for participants' complaints handling process, but the compliance 
programme orders referred to above go beyond orders requiring a particular 
complaints handling process. 
77  Section 246 of the Australian Consumer Law, 2010. 
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consumer measures" recognised by the UK Enterprise Act 2002. The latter 
Act purposefully defines these orders in broad terms so as to give enforcers 
suggesting such measures to suppliers, suppliers suggesting their own 
measures, and courts considering such measures the flexibility to propose 
suitable measures to "achieve better outcomes for consumers and compliant 
businesses".78 The definition of "measures in the compliance category" is  
… measures intended to prevent or reduce the risk of the occurrence or 
repetition of the conduct to which the enforcement order or undertaking relates 
(including measures with that purpose which may have the effect of improving 
compliance with consumer law more generally).79  
As is the case with all the enhanced consumer measures, an enforcement 
order or undertaking by a supplier may include only such measures "as the 
court or enforcer … considers to be just and reasonable."80 
In this regard,  
… the court or enforcer must in particular consider whether any proposed 
enhanced consumer measures are proportionate, taking into account (a) the 
likely benefit of the measures to consumers, (b) the costs likely to be incurred 
by the subject of the enforcement order or undertaking, and (c) the likely cost 
to consumers of obtaining the benefit of the measures.81  
The costs to the supplier which are considered include not only the actual 
cost of the measures but also the reasonable associated administrative 
costs.82 The Explanatory Notes to the Consumer Rights Act, 2015 give some 
examples of measures in the compliance and choice categories, namely an 
order or undertaking  
… appointing a compliance officer; introducing a complaints handling process; 
improving their record keeping; signing up to an established consumer review / 
feedback site; or publicising details of the breach or potential breach, and what 
they have done to put the situation right in the local or national press or on social 
media.83 
                                            
78  Explanatory Notes to the Consumer Rights Act, 2015 paras 372 and 375; Department 
for Business Innovation and Skills 2015 https://assets. 
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
431158/bis-15-292-guidance-for-enforcers-of-consumer-law.pdf para 9. 
79  Section 219A(3) of the Enterprise Act, 2002 (UK). 
80  Section 219B(1) of the Enterprise Act, 2002 (UK). 
81  Section 219B(2) of the Enterprise Act, 2002 (UK). 
82  Section 219B(3) of the Enterprise Act, 2002 (UK). 
83  Explanatory notes to the Consumer Rights Act, 2015 para 397. Note that some of 
these steps may be disproportionate in the case of a small business, e.g. the 
appointment of a full-time compliance officer (Department for Business Innovation and 
Skills 2015 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ 
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The relevant government Department's Guidance for enforcers on enhanced 
consumer measures gives the following additional examples:  
… providing better staff training / guidance to staff; undertaking internal spot 
checks (and maintaining records of these); collecting (and acting on) customer 
feedback; signing up to a certified ADR scheme and committing to be bound by 
its decisions.84  
5.3 Phased-in penalty orders 
Another type of innovative order aimed at strengthening the effectiveness of 
a court or NCT order that prohibited conduct discontinue is phased-in 
penalties. For example, a court or the NCT could order that if the prohibited 
conduct continue beyond a one-month phase-in period of a new system, the 
supplier pays a monthly penalty to the National Revenue Fund. Section 112 
of the CPA already gives the NCT the power to "impose an administrative 
fine in respect of prohibited or required conduct" to be paid into this fund. The 
CPA should be amended to specifically give courts the power to impose 
penalties too. The EC Injunctions Directive specifically provides for such 
penalties.85  
5.4 Redress orders 
A fourth type of innovative order that the CPA should provide for is a "redress 
order" applied for by an enforcer, namely the NCC or a provincial consumer 
protection authority. Currently, the CPA foresees that the NCC or provincial 
consumer protection authority may enforce the Act by issuing compliance 
notices ordering the supplier to stop the prohibited conduct.86 If the person to 
whom the compliance notice was issued fails to comply therewith, the NCC 
may apply to the NCT "for imposition of an administrative fine; or refer the 
matter to the National Prosecuting Authority for prosecution as an offence."87 
The NCC has in the past attempted to use a compliance notice to order a 
                                            
uploads/attachment_data/file/431158/bis-15-292-guidance-for-enforcers-of-
consumer-law.pdf 23. 
84  Department for Business Innovation and Skills 2015 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach
ment_data/file/431158/bis-15-292-guidance-for-enforcers-of-consumer-law.pdf 12 
para 46. 
85  Article 2(1)(c) of Directive 2009/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 23 April 2009 on Injunctions for the Protection of Consumers' Interests OJ L110 (1 
May 2009). Naude has argued that courts should consider such an order in exercising 
their s 52 power to make any order considered just and equitable when finding a 
contract or term to be unfair or unconscionable (Naude 2010 SALJ 532). 
86  Sections 100 and 84 of the CPA. 
87  Section 100(6) of the CPA. A person issued with a compliance order may approach 
the NCT for a review of that notice (s 101). 
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supplier who delivered a defective product to refund the consumer.88 
However, the NCT held that section 100 on compliance notices does not 
allow the NCC to do this.89 Section 73 of the CPA does, however, allow the 
NCC, when it believes that a person has engaged in prohibited conduct, to 
refer the matter to the NCT or to a provincial consumer court of the province 
where the supplier's principal place of business in the country is situated.90 
The NCT may then "make any applicable order contemplated in the Act".91 In 
this regard, the NCT has in the past, in an application brought by the NCC, 
ordered a supplier to refund the consumer when goods were held to be 
defective under section 55, but where the supplier failed to adhere to a ruling 
by the applicable industry ombud.92 Enforcers should probably also be given 
the power to ask for measures giving redress to consumers who have not yet 
submitted a complaint to the NCC, but where it is clear that the supplier 
caused such consumers loss or that such consumers should be entitled to 
cancel their contract. This is also the position in the UK, where the Enterprise 
Act 2002 defines enhanced consumer measures falling within the redress 
category as  
(a) measures offering compensation or other redress to consumers who 
have suffered loss as a result of the conduct which has given rise to the 
enforcement order or undertaking, 
(b) where the conduct referred to in paragraph (a) relates to a contract, 
measures offering such consumers the option to terminate (but not vary) 
that contract, 
(c) where such consumers cannot be identified, or cannot be identified 
without disproportionate cost to the subject of the enforcement order or 
undertaking, measures intended to be in the collective interests of 
consumers.93 
The relevant UK Department's Guidance for enforcers on enhanced 
consumer measures states that if an order for measures in all three 
categories (redress, compliance and choice) would be disproportionate, the 
enforcer should first consider whether a redress measure should be 
                                            
88  Volkswagen South Africa v National Consumer Commission 2013 ZANCT 10 (13 
February 2013) para 46; Accordian Investments (Pty) Limited v National Consumer 
Commission 2013 ZANCT 57 (11 November 2013) paras 31-32. 
89  Volkswagen South Africa v National Consumer Commission 2013 ZANCT 10 (13 
February 2013) para 46; Accordian Investments (Pty) Limited v National Consumer 
Commission 2013 ZANCT 57 (11 November 2013) paras 31-32. 
90  Section 73(1)(c)(iii) and s 73(2) of the CPA. 
91  Section 75(4)(b) of the CPA. 
92  National Consumer Commission v Western Car Sales CC t/a Western Car Sales 2017 
ZANCT 102 (14 September 2017). 
93  Section 219A(2) of the UK Enterprise Act, 2002. 
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prioritised.94 The enforcer or court must also ensure that the cost of the 
redress scheme for the supplier will not be more than the consumer’s loss.95 
However, the cost of the scheme does not encompass administrative costs 
of the scheme, for example, the cost of contacting consumers to offer them 
redress, although the administrative costs are considered in the 
proportionality enquiry.96 Measures in the collective interests of consumers 
may be apposite, for example, where it is unreasonably onerous for the 
supplier to contact all the affected consumers, e.g. where many consumers 
each suffered a small amount of loss.97 The Guidance refers to an example 
where some of a petrol station's pumps were wrongly calibrated so that less 
petrol was dispensed than was paid for.98 It was then calculated that about 
5000 consumers had each been overcharged by an average of £3. Given the 
difficulties of identifying which consumers used the defective pumps, and that 
some of them paid in cash and that credit card payments could not be linked 
to specific pumps, it would be more appropriate for the enforcer to seek an 
order that the supplier pay £15,000 to a local consumer charity. The 
possibility of such an order is also recognised by section 76 CPA, which 
allows a court to award  
… damages against a supplier for collective injury to all or a class of consumers 
generally, to be paid on any terms or conditions that the court considers just 
and equitable and suitable to achieve the purposes of this Act.99  
Damages for collective injury to all consumers could conceivably also lead to 
an order that the supplier pays a certain amount to a consumer organisation, 
as specifically foreseen by the UK Enterprise Act 2002. 
The UK Guidance also points out that a business will have to show that it took 
appropriate steps to identify the consumers who suffered loss, e.g. through 
                                            
94  Department for Business Innovation and Skills 2015 https://assets. 
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
431158/bis-15-292-guidance-for-enforcers-of-consumer-law.pdf 14 para 48. 
95  Department for Business Innovation and Skills 2015 https://assets. 
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
431158/bis-15-292-guidance-for-enforcers-of-consumer-law.pdf 14 para 50; see also 
s 219B(2) of the UK Enterprise Act, 2002. 
96  Department for Business Innovation and Skills 2015 https://assets. 
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
431158/bis-15-292-guidance-for-enforcers-of-consumer-law.pdf 14; s 219B(5) of the 
UK Enterprise Act, 2002. 
97  Department for Business Innovation and Skills 2015 https://assets. 
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
431158/bis-15-292-guidance-for-enforcers-of-consumer-law.pdf 19 para 62. 
98 Department for Business Innovation and Skills 2015 https://assets. 
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
431158/bis-15-292-guidance-for-enforcers-of-consumer-law.pdf 20. 
99  Section 76(1)(c) of the CPA. 
T NAUDE & E DE STADLER  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  24 
social media, before considering the possibility of payment to a consumer 
charity.100 In addition, consumers are not obliged to accept the offers of 
redress sought by enforcers and ordered by a court. They may institute action 
against the supplier for their actual loss.101 
5.5 Some questions raised 
Should a court or the NCT have the right to order at least some "enhanced 
consumer measures" of its own accord in order to prevent future prohibited 
conduct where it is not an enforcer who applies for such measures, but a 
matter was brought by an individual consumer? There is some precedent for 
this possibility in section 52 of the CPA, headed "Powers of court to ensure 
fair and just conduct, terms and conditions". 
Section 52 of the CPA is written with the paradigm in mind of an individual 
consumer challenging his/her individual agreement or terms thereof on the 
basis of unconscionability or unfairness. Nevertheless, section 52(3) gives a 
court finding that a transaction "was in whole or in part, unconscionable, 
unjust, unreasonable or unfair" the power to make "any further order the court 
considers just and reasonable" including an order  
… requiring the supplier to cease any practice, or alter any practice, form or 
document, as required to avoid a repetition of the supplier's conduct.  
This power should be used to make publicity orders such as an order that the 
supplier must publicise the fact that a particular term in its standards terms 
was found to be unfair under section 48, in order to increase the effectiveness 
of the order that the term is unfair. This could include an order that existing 
customers be informed in writing of the court order.102 In addition, the supplier 
could be ordered to inform the National Consumer Commission and 
provincial consumer protection authorities of an order that a particular term 
or terms was held to be unfair.103 In addition, it has been argued that courts 
should consider ordering penalties for the continued use of unfair terms by 
the supplier, after an initial phase-out period.104 For example, the court could 
                                            
100 Department for Business Innovation and Skills 2015 https://assets. 
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
431158/bis-15-292-guidance-for-enforcers-of-consumer-law.pdf 21. 
101 Department for Business Innovation and Skills 2015 https://assets. 
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
431158/bis-15-292-guidance-for-enforcers-of-consumer-law.pdf 21. 
102  See also Naude 2010 SALJ 532. 
103  Naude 2010 SALJ 532. 
104  Naude 2010 SALJ 532. 
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order the payment per month of a certain penalty for the use of each term 
held to be unfair.105 
The court's abovementioned power to award "damages against a supplier for 
collective injury to all or a class of consumers generally" is granted to any 
court "considering a matter in terms of this Act". This seems to imply that a 
court may make such an order even where an individual consumer, and not 
an enforcer, seeks relief from the court. However, it would be more 
appropriate for a court to award this type of damages at the instance of a 
regulator or in response to a class action seeking such damages. 
The CPA should give courts and the NCT the power to make orders of their 
own accord aimed at enhanced consumer measures, after affording the 
supplier a sufficient opportunity to respond. 
5.6 Powers that should be granted to enforcers in relation to 
innovative orders 
As noted above, enforcers should probably not be granted the power to order 
innovative measures as understood in this Part of this article through 
compliance notices, but they should be given the power to seek undertakings 
from suppliers to take appropriate measures to best protect consumers. If no 
undertaking can be agreed upon within a specified reasonable consultation 
period (probably 14 days, or 28 days if a trade association is involved, as in 
the UK), enforcers should be given the power to apply to the NCT or a court 
for the types of orders mentioned in this Part above. 
When seeking such an order or an undertaking, the enforcer should propose 
the time within which the measures must be taken, and the undertaking or 
order should provide for such a time period.106 The legislation should provide 
that an undertaking or order  
… may include requirements as to the provision of information or documents to 
the court [or NCT] by the person in order that the court may determine if the 
person is taking those measures.107 
The enforcer should also be given powers to determine whether the 
measures undertaken or ordered by a court or the NCT are complied with 
and to bring the matter back to the court or NCT in the case of non-
compliance. 
                                            
105  Naude 2010 SALJ 532. 
106  Also see s 217(10A) of the UK Enterprise Act, 2002. 
107  Section 217(10D) of the UK Enterprise Act, 2002. 
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The UK Enterprise Act not only empowers public enforcers to apply for 
enhanced consumer measures, but provides for the availability of such 
measures to private enforcers specified by the Secretary of State, provided 
certain conditions are satisfied, such as that the enforcer or an associated 
undertaking would not be directly advantaged by the enhanced consumer 
measures.108 These provisions could be considered when giving accredited 
South African consumer organisations the power to seek such undertakings 
and orders from suppliers. 
The NCC or Department of Trade and Industry should also issue a Guidance 
on these types of orders once such provisions are included in the legislation. 
Giving the NCT and courts some flexibility to make proposals to suppliers on 
what would be appropriate measures to enhance consumer rights is in line 
with a trend in the European Union, for instance, towards "experimentalist 
governance", which inter alia renders "rule making more flexible and 
responsive to contextual differences and changing circumstances"109 and 
therefore "seeks to encourage experimentation by a range of alternative 
methods."110 As the courts or NCT is proposed to be the final arbiter if the 
enforcer and supplier cannot agree on what measures would be appropriate, 
and as some parameters should be set for what an enforcer may propose, 
this is a hybrid approach which uses some elements of the experimentalist 
governance approach and some elements of a more traditional "command-
and-control" model of governance111 (the latter being based on "carefully 
delegated mandates" to administrative bodies and "nearly self-enforcing 
rules".)112 
6 Conclusion 
The courts' and the National Consumer Tribunal's power to make an 
unspecified innovative order "that better advances, protects, promotes and 
assures the realisation by consumers of their rights in terms of this Act" is a 
useful one. However, the legislation should be amended to provide some 
broad parameters for the types of innovative orders that could be made and 
the procedure enforcers should follow before applying for such orders 
(including requiring a consultation period), whilst allowing enforcers, courts 
and the NCT the flexibility to propose voluntary undertakings or orders that 
                                            
108  Section 219C of the UK Enterprise Act, 2002. 
109  Sabel and Zeitlin 2008 ELJ 303. 
110  De Búrca and Scott 2007 Colum J Eur L 515. 
111  De Búrca and Scott 2007 Colum J Eur L 514, 517. 
112  Sabel and Zeitlin 2008 ELJ 275. 
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are best suited to the particular case. The provisions on publicity orders and 
"enhanced consumer measures" in the UK Enterprise Act 2002 may serve as 
a good model in this regard.  
The courts and the NCT hearing a matter brought by an individual consumer 
(as opposed to an enforcer) should probably also have the power to consider 
such innovative orders aimed at preventing the supplier from continuing with 
the prohibited conduct towards other consumers, provided the supplier is 
given sufficient chance to make submissions. Orders that the supplier publish 
the order in an appropriate way are unlikely to be too onerous in this regard.  
Currently the power to make unspecified innovative orders plays a further 
important role in the application of the CPA as a number of provisions create 
a consumer right without a remedy. It is not satisfactory that an administrative 
fine be the only sanction for the breach of such rights. Rather, the consumer 
should have a right to redress. The CPA should therefore be amended to fill 
the gaps and set out the consumer's remedies in all such instances. In the 
meantime, courts and the NCT should use their power to make innovative 
orders to fashion appropriate remedies in such instances. Innovative orders 
are also sometimes appropriate "to give practical effect to the consumer's 
right of access to redress", such as the NCT's creation of an innovative order 
that the prescription of the right to approach the NCT is suspended while the 
consumer has exercised his or her right to approach any of the enforcement 
agencies listed in section 69. This rule is necessary to "assure the realisation 
by consumers of their rights" in terms of section 69. Where a provision is 
arguably ambiguous and a purposive interpretation cries out for a consumer 
remedy not explicitly granted by the text of the CPA, the legislation should be 
amended to provide for a remedy. In the meantime, courts and the NCT may 
use their power to make innovative orders to provide such a remedy. An 
example would be the consumer's right to terminate a fixed-term agreement 
on notice upon payment of a reasonable cancellation penalty (section 14). 
The purpose of protecting consumers from being bound for overly long 
periods applies with even greater force to agreements "in perpetuity" or "for 
the lifetime of the consumer", even though strictly speaking such agreements 
can probably not be described as "fixed term" agreements. Thus, until section 
14 is amended, courts and the NCT should grant consumers the right to 
cancel such agreements as well. 
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